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Abstract
In this report, we describe the design and functioning of a logic-
based framework for privacy evaluation and user feedback. This
framework is meant to be running on the user’s side and to track
user’s actions, i.e. disclosures that she makes, in order to evaluate
the profiles different providers hold about her. The evaluation is
based on the utilised credential technologies, providers authentica-
tion, data storage and data sharing policies and on actual interac-
tions between the user and providers when services are consumed.
Besides providing feedback on the achieved privacy level, the frame-
work can also be applied for inspecting the consequences of potential
subsequent disclosures. This allows the user to make an informed de-
cision on which disclosures to make or to choose between alternative
authentication policies.
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Abstract. In this report, we describe the design and functioning of a
logic-based framework for privacy evaluation and user feedback. This
framework is meant to be running on the user’s side and to track user’s
actions, i.e. disclosures that she makes, in order to evaluate the profiles
different providers hold about her. The evaluation is based on the utilised
credential technologies, providers authentication, data storage and data
sharing policies and on actual interactions between the user and providers
when services are consumed. Besides providing feedback on the achieved
privacy level, the framework can also be applied for inspecting the conse-
quences of potential subsequent disclosures. This allows the user to make
an informed decision on which disclosures to make or to choose between
alternative authentication policies.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, many services are offered as electronic services. As they often pro-
vide better customer-experience and efficiency, they are a preferred option of
many users. Areas ranging over commerce, finance and governmental services
are thus establishing a strong online existence. Most common examples are on-
line shops, social networks, banking sites, or administrative communication with
the governmental bodies, such as tax authorities.
While the early versions of online services were offered by a single provider,
they are now often provided through a collaboration of multiple entities, each
of which covers a specific aspect of the business, using collaboration to increase
their efficiency and effectiveness. Every provider in such collaboration has a dis-
tinct role, with specific responsibilities and authorisations. In the online shopping
example, the shop utilises the order information, while the delivery service re-
quires the user’s address and a third party payment service receives the banking
data. Additionally, some providers have a business model that does not require
the users to pay for a service, but the gathered data about them is monetised
by being sold to other parties, such as advertisement providers. Consequently,
not only are the users in direct communication with a growing number of online
providers, but their personal data is reaching even more entities.
All this represents a challenge for tracking the knowledge databases of providers
and assessing an individual’s dynamics privacy level. In order to determine the
partial identities that several providers store about a user, it would be necessary
to keep track of all user activities, i.e. disclosures, and the alternative flows of
information, i.e. exchange of data amongst providers.
In order to tackle this, we built a logic-based framework for providing feed-
back on the user’s privacy level. Our framework is implemented in the Prolog
logic programming language and is intended to operate on the user’s side and
model the observed system and all the disclosures that a user has made, allow-
ing to pose queries about the resulting privacy level, i.e. the knowledge of the
providers with which the user directly or indirectly interacts. Besides being ben-
eficial for the users, the framework can also be used by system developers. They
would model a chosen system design and specify scenarios of interest, on which
queries can be made. This can provide insight on the attained users’ privacy
level and allow them to detect if privacy requirements are met.
2 The privacy-feedback framework
The privacy-feedback framework is meant to evaluate the attained privacy level
of a user by informing her about her partial identities as seen by the providers.
It takes as input the relevant technologies, service providers with which the user
interacts, and the user’s previous actions, i.e. disclosures. The system also takes
into account the potential merges of the databases of providers based on their
collaborations. As a result, it provides the information on the partial identities
as seen by the interacting providers.
Besides getting feedback on the current privacy level, the users are able to
make queries about the effect potential disclosures would have on their privacy
and help choose between service providers or alternative authentication policies.
The rest of this section describes the framework design, by explaining its
conceptual model and the semantic data representations.
2.1 Conceptual model
The conceptual model of the framework is presented in Figure 1. It takes as input
a model of the system, which is translated into a readily-executed object code.
The user poses queries on this code, the results of which provide information
about her privacy level.
The process components are described in the rest of this section.
Input models The input models represent models of the different system as-
pects. They include the following:
– The credential model represents users’ credentials used in interactions with
providers. For instance, the utilised types of credentials can be national iden-
tity cards, loyalty credentials or student cards. This model includes the cre-
dential technologies present in the system and credential templates used.
The credential technologies are relevant for representing the consequences
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Fig. 1. The conceptual model of the privacy-feedback framework.
of their usage for disclosures. For instance, showing one attribute with an
X.509 credential would lead to disclosure of all credential attributes. On the
other hand, anonymous credential technologies allow for selective disclosure
of attributes. A credential of a specific type and technology is assumed to
have a unique structure. The credential templates specify this structure, by
defining the set and ordering of attributes in a credential which is defined
by a specific technology-type combination.
– The provider-specific model defines the data handling practices in terms of
collection, storage and possible sharing with other entities. It is based on
the privacy policies of providers, that specify which data is collected, pro-
cessed, stored and made available to other entities. On the other hand, the
provider-specific model also specifies users’ trust in providers. Namely, if a
user trusts the providers’ specified privacy policies, the privacy level feed-
back is constructed based on them. However, if the user does not trust the
providers to limit the storage of collected data, or not to share her data with
other providers, the model reflects this and provides feedback based on the
user’s expectations. The feedback can also be constructed for the worst case
scenario, where all collected data is considered to be stored, processed and
shared with all other observed providers.
– Another input element is the definition of identifiability models. On the one
hand, it specifies the unique attributes and attribute sets. The uniqueness
property is assumed to depend on the source and certifier of an attribute.
This information is used for determining existence of links between differ-
ent user profiles, i.e. determining that they pertain to the same individual.
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Two profiles containing the same unique attribute or attribute set are con-
sidered to be linked together. The second part of the identifiability model
assigns all attributes with a weight. The weight represents the sensitivity
of the attribute’s disclosure and depends on the kind of attribute and its
source, i.e. trustworthiness. For instance, attributes certified by the govern-
ment are more trustworthy than a free user input, and can thus have a higher
weight. This information is relevant for calculating the privacy cost of a dis-
closure, e.g. by summing up the weights of disclosed attributes or applying
more complex algorithms. With this model, the framework can inform the
users about quantified privacy costs of specific disclosures, thus helping the
disclosure-decision making process.
– Finally, concrete user actions are modelled as the final and cumulative part
of the input. They represent tracked user behaviour and disclosures towards
different providers. Based on them, the current privacy level of a user is
determined.
The input models are flexible and can be removed, added and updated as
needed. This allows to model different systems and provide an up-to-date view
on user privacy.
Queries and results For the production of the feedback, queries are posed on
the compiled Prolog model. Posing specific queries allows to obtain information
about different aspects of the user privacy level. Examples are:
– Getting an overview of all of the profiles held by chosen or all modelled
providers.
– Information on all identifiable profiles.
– Verifying if one of the recorded profiles contains a specific attribute or a set
of attributes. This may refer to a fully specified attribute or only an attribute
name or value.
– The links between the profiles, their holders and the reasons for each of the
links’ creations.
– The cost of a particular disclosure.
All of the above queries can also be made for a hypothetical scenario. Namely,
the user can define a set of assumptions, including potential actions or providers’
trustworthiness, for which she wishes to inspect the achieved privacy level.
Implementation The framework is built using the Prolog declarative logic
programming language1. It allowed us to model the privacy aspects of a system
through the following means:
– Asserted facts create the initial knowledge database of the system. They are
also used to specify the collaboration between providers and to define the
attribute sets that are considered unique. When determining the privacy cost
of a disclosure, they are used to assign weights to specific attributes.
1 The code is available at https://github.com/mmilica
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– Rules allow to model the possible information flow in the system. A certain
level of ’imperative’ programming may be achieved, by invoking a desired
action, such as assertion, when a goal or query is executed.
– Data structures are represented with predicates with appropriate number of
arguments.
– Queries allow to ask for the list of information held by the providers, list of
links that can be made, whether a specific data set is present in a provider’s
knowledge database, and the expense of a particular disclosure.
2.2 Semantic data representations
The framework handles information in the form of adequate data structures.
They capture the information and its relevant metadata. Examples of such struc-
tures are user profiles, attributes, attributes’ definitions, credential templates and
instantiated credentials.
User profiles The data that is disclosed to the providers is modelled with
user profiles. A profile represents a collection of pieces of information which are
revealed by the user within one uninterrupted interaction with a provider, i.e.
in one session, and that are stored by the provider2. The profiles are created
dynamically, as the occurring user actions are modelled. For instance, showing
an attribute is modelled as invoking actions of recording the attribute and its
metadata in the provider’s database and creating applicable links within the
providers database and between collaborating providers’ databases. Every link
between profiles represents the fact that they pertain to the same individual.
The way they are formed is presented in Section 3.
Besides consisting of the disclosed information, every profile is identified with
a transaction identifier (TID). The identifier is freshly generated for each estab-
lished connection, even with the same user3. The identifier is consequently linked
to all the disclosed pieces of information within one interaction, including cre-
dential disclosures and free user input:
Profilei = {TID i : {Attributeij}j∈{1..n}} .
An illustration of the framework’s database is provided in Figure 2. Every
service provider SPk is linked with the profiles it had constructed, identified
with TIDki. Every profile contains a set of attributes, each linked with its source
information. The source information can point to free user input or a certified
2 The information storing policy of a provider is also represented with the system
model. A disclosed piece of information is modelled as stored if the provider policy
specifies so, or if the user does not trust the provider and assumes that all collected
data is also stored.
3 The provider will only be able to deduce the link between different interactions with
the same user, if she discloses the same unique attribute or attribute set in both. As
the system can model the metadata, such as IP addresses, this can also be used for
establishing an existence of a link between profiles.
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Fig. 2. The knowledge database of the framework.
credential identified by its type, technology and the issuer. The established links
between these profiles are denoted with dotted lines.
Every existing profile entry is modelled in Prolog as an asserted fact. The
predicate of the fact has as arguments the identifier of the service provider which
holds the knowledge of the profile entry, the transaction identifier and a recorded
attribute with its source:
profile(SP, TIDi, Attributeij, Sourceij).
In case one provider offers multiple services to users, this is modelled as
the existence of multiple providers which collaborate, i.e. share their knowledge
databases. The framework considers all the data to be exchanged between them,
reflecting the fact that all the data is held by one entity. At the same time, the
information about which service was requested by the user is maintained – it is
encoded in the service-specific identifier of the interacting provider.
Credentials Two types of credential structures are handled by the system:
credential templates and issued credentials.
Credential templates specify the structure of a specific kind of credentials and
are used to specify the ordering of attributes they record and their properties
(e.g. whether the issuer learns the attribute value and who chooses the value,
user or issuer). They are used for determining the position of an attribute of
interest within a credential and possibly checking some of its properties, e.g.
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uniqueness. Templates do not contain attributes, as values are not assigned yet,
but only contain attribute definitions:
CredTemplatei = {Technology i, Typei, [List of AttrDefinitions]i} .
The Technology argument refers to the specification of the credential tech-
nology, such as X.509 or Idemix, while the Type represents its purpose, such as
Belgian eID or a store’s loyalty credential. Every credential template is uniquely
identified with the type and technology combination.
On the other hand, issued credentials contain the actual attribute values,
but not the properties, as this information is available in the template specifi-
cations. Issuance of credentials is modelled as creation of a credential structure
with initialised attributes, i.e. attributes with assigned values. It also asserts the
ownership of the user interacting with the issuer4. However, this does not require
the issuer to learn the identity of the user.
Attributes There are two attribute structures used in the framework. One
models the attributes’ definitions which appear in the credential templates, while
the other represents the instantiated credential- and profile-attributes.
The attributes of a user, which constitute her (partial) identity, are repre-
sented with the attribute name and value:
Attribute
Profilei
ij = {AttrNamej , AttrValuej} .
This structure is recorded as part of a user profile or an issued credential. In
a user profile, every attribute is paired with its source information.
Attribute definition structure contains the following fields:
AttrDefinitioni =
{AttrNamei, ValueTypei, IssuerKnowledgei, ValueChoicei, Sharing i} .
The AttrName of the attribute does not need to be unique. The ValueType
defines the type of this attribute’s value, such as ’String’ or ’Integer’. The Is-
suerKnowledge and ValueChoice are fields representing whether the attribute
is disclosed to the issuer of the credential and whether the value is assigned
by the issuer or chosen by the user, respectively. Finally, the Sharing property
describes the level of attribute uniqueness. An attribute value can be unique
or shared amongst a differing number of users. For instance, a social security
number is defined as unique, while name or date of birth are not and address
attribute is considered to have a restricted sharing property.
Examples of an attribute structure and an attribute definition (linked to a
specific credential) as represented in Prolog are:
4 This allows the framework to go through the list of user’s credentials, e.g. if it is
extended to offer determining the optimal choice for satisfying an authentication
policy (minimising the cost of the disclosure, as in Section 4.3).
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attribute(′ZIP′, ′3000′).
attrDef(′ZIP′, ′ZipCode′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared′).
The definition specifies that the attribute is learned by the issuer of the
credential (i.e. ’Known’), it is assigned by the issuer (i.e. ’Assigned’) and its
value is shared by multiple users (i.e. ’Shared’).
Since the framework also models the value aspect of attributes, this allows for
extension of the framework’s functionality. Namely, some authentication policies
require only proving properties of attributes, e.g. age is over 25. For trustworthy
providers, it is assumed that only this property is recorded. In addition, the
Idemix credential technology supports proving certain properties of attributes,
without disclosing their values. Therefore, the framework can be extended to
model collection or storage of only attribute properties.
3 Feedback creation
When a user reveals a piece of information, it is recorded by the interacting
provider as a profile entry5. After the new entry is created, the framework tries
to create links to other recorded profiles. It first checks whether the attribute
is unique in which case the same attribute is searched for in other profiles.
If a match is found in other profiles, they are marked as linked. Every link
between profiles is recorded through a linking predicate with profiles’ transaction
identifiers as arguments. It also specifies the reason for linking, i.e. the unique
attribute. Next, the unique attribute sets are evaluated. Similarly as with unique
attributes, the links are recorded with the set definition as a reason for creating
the link. In Prolog, a user action, e.g. a disclosure is represented as a head of a
rule, the body of which includes performing the needed checks, e.g. which type of
credential is used and which consequences it entails, and invoking profile entries
creation.
Initially, the user requests a specific service (reqService) from a service
provider (SP) over a transaction identified with TID. The related Prolog rule has
the form6:
reqService(User, SP, TID, Service) : −
authPolicy(SP, Service, ListOfAttrAndSourcePairs),
authenticate(User, SP, TID, ListOfAttrAndSourcePairs),
showMetadata(User, SP, TID, MetaData).
5 Whether a piece of information is stored depends on the provider’s storage policy.
Also, if the user does not trust the provider to limit the storage, all collected data
is considered to be stored by the provider.
6 The presentation of the implemented Prolog rules is optimised for clarity. The actual
implementation of the presented examples may be more compact or more detailed
and differs slightly in the used notations.
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Upon requesting a service, the authentication policy of the provider is con-
sulted (authPolicy). It specifies which attributes the user shows in the interac-
tion and their sources, e.g. specific credentials or free user input (ListOfAttrAnd
SourcePairs). Once the applicable policy is determined and the list of required
disclosures, the authentication is modelled. If there is network level data that the
provider obtains, which could be used for deriving links between user actions, it
is also included as part of the disclosure (showMetadata). For instance, if a user
utilises a static IP address for multiple sessions with providers, it is recorded
as part of the created profiles, as it can also be used for creating links between
profiles. The disclosures from different sources (e.g. credential source and free
user input) are modelled differently. In case of credential source the applicable
rule is:
authenticate(User, SP, TID, [First|Rest]) : −
First = attrAndSource(cred( , Technology, Type, ), AttrList),
Cred = cred(User, Technology, Type, ),
showCred(User, SP, TID, Cred, AttrList),
authenticate(User, SP, TID, Rest).
In this case, a credential of the user that has the required type and technology
is found and its show is modelled. If the disclosure refers to user input, the
applicable rule is:
authenticate(User, SP, TID, [First|Rest]) : −
First = attrAndSource(′userInput′, AttrList),
userInput(User, SP, TID, AttrList),
authenticate(User, SP, TID, Rest).
If the user discloses information by showing a credential, the utilised creden-
tial technology has an impact on the resulting disclosure. If the disclosure of a
piece of information is performed by having the user show an X.509 credential
attribute, the applicable Prolog rule has the form:
showCred(User, SP, TID, Credential, AttributeList) : −
Credential = cred(Alias, Technology, Type, ListOfCredAttrs),
Type = ′X.509′,
createFullListOfAttributesToShow(List, ListOfCredAttrs),
showCredentialAttributes(User, SP, TID, Credential, List).
This rule models the user showing a specific provider (SP) a chosen list of
credential attributes (AttributeList) over a transaction identified with TID.
The user’s credentials are also represented with aliases, which are used to assist
the user-side credential management. For showing an X.509 credential, the list of
attributes to be disclosed to the provider is created as a full list of credential at-
tributes (createFullListOfAttributesToShow). In case of Idemix credentials,
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only the specified attributes are shown (createListOfChosenAttributesToShow),
as selective disclosure is supported. In addition, it is also possible to only prove
ownership of an anonymous credential. The rule applicable to this case has the
form:
showCred(User, SP, TID, Credential, AttributeList) : −
Credential = cred(Alias, Technology, Type, ListOfCredAttrs),
Type = ′Idemix′,
createListOfChosenAttributesToShow(List, AttributeList),
showCredentialAttributes(User, SP, TID, Credential, List).
Showing a list of attributes is a recursive rule, which adds the attributes to
the provider’s knowledge database one by one, if specified in the storage policy.
The credential source is also listed as part of the database entry. Additionally,
it adds the entry to the collaborating providers’ databases, in case the sharing
policy specifies exchange of the given attribute:
showCredentialAttributes(User, SP, TID, Credential, List) : −
List = [AttributeNameAndValue|Rest],
Credential = cred(Alias, Technology, Type, ListOfCredAttrs),
getCredAttribute(Credential, ′Issuer′, Issuer),
Source = credSource(Technology, Type, Issuer),
addToProvidersDB(SP, TID, AttributeNameAndValue, Source),
addToCollaboratingProvidersDB(SP, TID, AttributeNameAndValue,
Source),
showCredentialAttributes(User, SP, TID, Credential, Rest).
An attribute that is disclosed to the provider is recoded in the knowledge
database either if the worse case is observed, or the user does not trust the
provider or the provider’s storage policy specifies storage of this attribute. Mak-
ing an entry in the providers database invokes the following actions. Firstly, a
check whether the profile entry exists in the database is performed. In case there
is no matching entry, the entry is asserted as part of the provider’s knowledge
database. Secondly, the creation of links between other profile entries, i.e. other
profiles identified with differing transaction identifiers, is initiated. Adding an
attribute to a collaborating provider’s database is performed in a similar way. It
only requires consulting the information sharing policy of the original provider
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to check whether the specific attribute is shared with the collaborating provider.
addToProvidersDB(SP, TID, Attribute, Source) : −
(
isWorstCase
; noUserTrust(SP)
; isStoredBySP(SP, Attribute, Source)
),
(
profileEntry(SP, TID, Attribute, Source), !
; assert(profileEntry(SP, TID, Attribute, Source)
),
establishLinksBetweenProfiles(SP, TID, Attribute, Source).
The links establishment starts with a check whether the given attribute, from
the specified source, is unique. In the case it is, the attribute is searched for in
other profiles. If a match is found, a link between the profiles is asserted with a
specification of the reason for its creation (e.g. matching unique citizen number
from the national ID card), unless the link was already recorded. If the link
already exists, but was recorded for another reason, the list of linking reasons
is simply extended. The link extends to other profiles linked to the one with
which a link is being established. The process is repeated for all matches that
are found:
establishLinksBetweenProfiles(SP, TID, Attribute, Source) : −
isUnique(Attribute, Source),
Attribute = attribute(Name, Value),
transactioID(TIDOther),
\+ TID = TIDOther,
searchForUniqueAttrInOtherProfiles(SP, TIDOther, Attribute,
Source),
recordProfilesLink(SP, TID, TIDOther, reason(uniqueAttr(Name,
Source))),
fail.
If the observed attribute is not unique, the sets of unique attributes which it
constitutes are searched for next. After determining the unique sets this attribute
belongs to, the sets are searched for in the provider’s database. The search
examines whether a set exists in the profile which the attribute belongs to and
all its linked profiles. If the provider records the unique set in a single or across
linked profiles, they are then searched for in other (linked) profiles. In case of a
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match, the profiles are denoted as linked. The process is repeated for all (linked)
profiles that contain the examined unique attribute set. The process is repeated
for all unique sets that contain the observed attribute. A simple illustration of
this rule is:
establishLinksBetweenProfiles(SP, TID, Attribute, Source) : −
searchForUniqueSetInLinkedProfiles(SP, TID, Attribute, UniqueSet),
transactioID(TIDOther),
\+ TID = TIDOther,
searchForUniqueSetInOtherProfiles(SP, TIDOther, UniqueSet),
Reason = reason(′UniqueSetInLinkedProfiles′, UniqueSet),
recordProfilesLink(SP, TID, TIDOther, Reason), fail.
A few examples of links recorded by providers are illustrated in Table 1.
The examples illustrates the assumption that the public key a user has in her
student card is a unique attribute and that set of address and date of birth from
a Belgian national identity card attributes form a unique attribute set.
Table 1. Examples of recorded links between user profiles.
Service Linked
Reason of link creation
provider profiles
Provider A TIDi & TIDj
uniqueAttribute{’PK’ in (’X.509’, ’student
card’, ’University’)}
Provider B TIDk & TIDl
uniqueAttrSet{’Address’ in (’X.509’, ’ID card’,
’Government’), ’DoB’ in (’X.509’, ’BeID’,
’Government’)}
For establishing the links, it is important to know which service providers col-
laborate in the sense that their recorded databases are exchanged. Every service
provider has a policy describing the authentication and disclosure requirements
placed on the users interested in the offered services. In addition, data manage-
ment policies state which obtained data is stored and how the data is further
distributed. However, the providers are not necessarily trusted to handle the ob-
tained data in the specified way. User trust can be divided into two categories:
– Users trust the service provider’s information storage and distribution poli-
cies, meaning that the storage of data and collaborations between providers
is modelled as stated in their privacy policies.
– The providers are not trusted to limit the storing of collected data or the
distribution of data to entities as stated in their policies. In this case, the
users may assume that the provider stores more or all data that it collects.
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Similarly, it may be assumed that certain providers share their databases,
or parts of their databases. The links between user profiles are established
according to the user’s assumptions, i.e. the level of trust in the providers.
From the point of view of finding new links between profiles, multiple profiles
are observed as one if there is an existing link between them. This means that
with every link that is created, the possibility of creating new links usually
increases. This is because a larger number of linked profiles has a larger set
of recorded attributes observed as belonging to one profiles. This increases the
probability of having an additional unique set that can be used for further links
creation.
The fact that the user attributes are modelled with their actual value allows
to enforce link creation based on the values, even if the source information dif-
fers. Posing restrictions on trusted sources which allow for creating links is also
possible.
After the user’s actions are modelled, the knowledge database can be exam-
ined through queries. An example of a query is checking which profiles of the
user are created. After posing the query:
?− profile(SP, TID, Attribute, Source).
The answer will consist of multiple elements, part of which is:
SP = ′AdsProvider′,
TID = ′99′,
Attribute = attribute(′StudentNumber′, ′12345678′),
Source = credentialSource(′X.509′, ′studentcard′, ′KULeuven′),
SP = ′AdsProvider′,
TID = ′99′,
Attribute = attribute(′DoB′, ′01.01.1980′),
Source = credentialSource(′X.509′, ′BeID′, government),
The user can also query all the information about her that a specific provider
holds, or all profiles that contain a specific attribute:
?− profile(′OnlineTravelAgency′, TID, Attribute, Source).
Similarly, the user can query which links are derived between her profiles:
?− isLinked(SP, TID1, TID2, Reason).
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The result would be in the form:
SP = ′AdsProvider′,
TID1 = ′99′,
TID2 = ′201′
Reason = uniqueAttribute(′PublicKey′, ′BeID′, ′government′),
The framework feedback relies on two types of identifiability quantification.
As considered previously, the first provides the definition of (sets of) attributes
from specific sources that allow to pinpoint an individual with some assurance.
The second model is the definition of the weights assigned to concrete user
attributes. They represent the cost of disclosure of the specific attribute. This
information is considered to be dynamic and for optimal results, it would be
provided by a trusted party which is assumed to have better overview on user
attributes’ statistics, but also be familiar with the potentials of the data mining
techniques. For increased preciseness, the attribute weight would also depend on
the actual attribute value.
The information about a cost of a disclosure can also be obtained. By query-
ing for a cost, the verification of a head of the applicable rule invokes the calcu-
lation, i.e. summation of the attribute weights and the result is printed for the
user:
?− createWeightCount(User, SP, TID, ListOfCredsAndRevealedAttrsPairs).
4 Use cases
In order to illustrate the use of the framework, three simple use cases are con-
sidered. The first illustrates usage of the framework for getting feedback on the
current privacy level of the user. The second and third demonstrate how the
framework can assist the user with making disclosure decisions and with choos-
ing between different disclosure policies of a provider, respectively7.
In the examples, the user is assumed to own a set of credentials. The is-
sued credentials contain the ‘expiration’ attribute, limiting their validity. This
attribute is used in every interaction to prove credential validity, but is not mod-
elled in this work for simplicity reasons. We assume that its value is created in a
way that does not increase the chances of linking different interactions in which
the same credential is used. Additionally, the issuers of the users’ credentials
learns certain attributes of the users at the time of issuance. The framework
can model the issuers as providers that store their profiles created based on
7 The code that implements the presented use cases can be found at https://github.
com/mmilica
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the issuance interaction. However, for simplicity reasons, the issuers’ knowledge
databases are not modelled in the presented use cases.
Some of the credentials that the user is assumed to own are of type X.509.
This standard specifies that the credential contains, among other attributes, a
serial number and the owner’s public key. The serial number is unique for every
certification authority and thus allows to uniquely identifying a credential. The
public key is also a uniquely identifying attribute. In the observed examples,
we do not model these attributes for credentials that contain another unique
attribute, as one unique attribute suffices to uniquely identify the credential and
allow for linking of different sessions where the credential is presented.
The user is assumed to own the credentials represented in Table 2:
– A government-issued electronic ID card, containing the following attributes8:
AttrList1 = {Name, Surname, DoB, Address, PK}
– An electronic credential representing a shopper card. This can be a credential
linked to the loyalty scheme that a shop offers. It is issued by the online shop
and contains the following attributes:
AttrList2 = {ZIP Code, Customer number}
– A student card issued by a university that records:
AttrList3 = {Name, Surname, Student number, University, PKS}
– An anonymous credential containing the same attributes as the electronic
identity card, recertified by a trusted third party (TTP).
The system’s identifiability models assume the following:
– All modelled public keys have unique values.
– The customer number contained in a shopper card of a specific provider is
assumed to be unique.
– It is assumed that student numbers are unique per university which issues
them.
– The issuance of student cards is assumed to allow for unique identification of
an individual through the combination of the student number and the date
of birth attributes.
Table 2. User’s credentials.
Credential Type Tech. Attributes Issuer
eID Identity card X.509 AttrList1 Government
Shopper card Shop-issued card X.509 AttrList2 Online shop
Student card Student status card X.509 AttrList3 University
ID card Identity credential Idemix AttrList1 TTP
8 ’DoB’ in the list of attributes represents a date of birth and ’PK’ denotes a public
key.
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In the observed examples, the providers have specific authentication policies,
but are assumed to collect all data that is disclosed to them.
4.1 Feedback on user privacy level
The system being modelled is an online store, with which a user engages in
multiple interactions over time. The store’s authentication policy requires the
user to prove the age of majority using a government-issued credential in order
to receive the services9. Optionally, the user may also provide proof of a student
status, for obtaining a discount. For this, a university-signed student card is
accepted. However, the user has low trust in the store and believes it stores all
data it receives in an interaction, not just the data specified in the authentication
policy.
The online store is further assumed to collaborate with an ads provider, which
subsequently sends personalised ads to the users through the store’s site. The
ads provider also collaborates with other service providers with which the user
is assumed to have previously interacted. Therefore, before an initial purchase
at the observed shop, the ads provider already holds a profile of this user. It
is assumed to contain the user’s student number and date of birth, but also
information on a previous purchase. More details on the actual implementation
of this use case are provided in Appendix Appendix A.
A relevant snippet of the providers’ databases is presented in Table 3. The
links are also established and the existing links are based on the student number
that is revealed.
Table 3. The initial state of the knowledge database.
Service
Recorded profiles
Established
provider links
Online shop / /
Ads provider TID1 : {Student numberU, DoBU, Purchases1} /
In the interactions with the online shop (Table 4), the user makes purchases
’Purchase2’ and ’Purchase3’ on two separate occasions, disclosing the required
date of birth from the identity card and the student status using her student
card.
The resulting state of the providers’ knowledge databases after the two inter-
actions is represented in Table 510. The online shop records two profiles. However,
they contain all the attributes in both the electronic identity card issued by the
9 We do not model the disclosure of the bank details for payment purposes, and assume
that the user remains anonymous through the payment procedure.
10 The actual attribute values are also recorded in the database, but are not listed in
the table for clarity reasons.
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Table 4. The state of the updated knowledge database (a).
Service Transaction Used Disclosed
provider ID credential attributes
Online shop TID2
BeID {DoBU}BeID
Student card {Ownership}UniCard
Free input {Purchase2}Free
Online shop TID3
BeID {DoBU}BeID
Student card {Ownership}UniCard
Free input {Purchase3}Free
government and the student card. This is the consequence of using X.509 cre-
dentials with providers which are assumed to store all received data. The two
profiles are also linked as belonging to the same user, as they contain unique
attributes, such as public keys and the unique set consisting of the student num-
ber attribute in combination with the university or the date of birth. The two
purchases are thus concluded to be done by the same individual and the reasons
for their linking are recorded as:
1. uniqueAttribute{’PK’ in (’X.509’, ’student card’, ’IssuingUniversity’)}
2. uniqueAttribute{’PK’ in (’X.509’, ’BeID’, ’Government’)}
3. uniqueAttrSet{’StudentNumber’ in (’X.509’, ’student card’, ’IssuingUniver-
sity’), ’University’ in (’X.509’, ’student card’, ’IssuingUniversity’)}
4. uniqueAttrSet{’StudentNumber’ in (’X.509’, ’student card’, ’IssuingUniver-
sity’), ’DoB’ in (’X.509’, ’BeID’, ’Government’)}
The ads provider updates its database with the same two profiles, but is
able to make even more links and to associate earlier purchases made with other
providers. At this point, it can link the users identity to the earlier (pseudony-
mous) purchase. The reason for creating these additional links is also recorded:
1. uniqueAttrSet{’StudentNumber’ in (’X.509’, ’student card’, ’IssuingUniver-
sity’), ’DoB’ in (’X.509’, ’BeID’, ’Government’)}
4.2 Choosing between service providers
If a user is presented with a choice of different service providers offering the
same service, but having different authentication policies, the framework can be
used to determine which of them offers the preferred privacy level to the user.
For illustrating this use case, we use an example of two online bookshops. Their
policies are represented in Table 6.
Both bookshops offer their services only to registered users and impose a
minimal age requirement. The first bookshop requires the user to authenticate
by disclosing the age recorded in her identity card issued by the government and
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Table 5. The state of the updated knowledge database (b).
Service
Recorded profiles
Established
provider links
Online shop
TID2 : {Student numberU, UniversityU,
{TID2, TID3}
NameU, SurnameU, PKS−U}UniCard ,
{NameU, SurnameU, AddressU, DoBU,
PKU}BeID , {Purchases2}Free
TID3 : {Student numberU, UniversityU,
NameU, SurnameU, PKS−U}UniCard ,
{NameU, SurnameU, AddressU, DoBU,
PKU}BeID , {Purchases3}Free
Ads provider
TID1 : {Student numberU}UniCard ,
{TID1,
TID2, TID3}
{DoBU}BeID , {Purchase1}Free
TID2 : {Student numberU, UniversityU,
NameU, SurnameU, PKS−U}UniCard ,
{NameU, SurnameU, AddressU, DoBU,
PKU}BeID , {Purchases2}Free
TID3 : {Student numberU, UniversityU,
NameU, SurnameU, PKS−U}UniCard ,
{NameU, SurnameU, AddressU, DoBU
PKU}BeID , {Purchases3}Free
Table 6. Service providers and their authentication policies.
Service provider Authentication policy
Bookshop A
eIDgov: {DoB}
Shopper card: {Customer number}
User input: Shipping address
Bookshop B
eIDgov or IDTTP: {DoB}
Shopper card: {Customer number}
User input: Shipping address
Table 7. Service providers and their storage policies.
Service provider Authentication policy
Bookshop A
Shopper card: {Customer number}
User input: Shipping address
Bookshop B
eIDgov or IDTTP: {DoB}
Shopper card: {Customer number}
User input: Shipping address
18
showing the customer number from a certified customer credential and input the
shipping address. On the other hand, the second bookshop allows to prove that
the age requirement is fulfilled by using either the government-issued ID card
or the identity credential issued by a trusted third party. Their data storage
policies are represented in Table 7.
Untrusted providers. We first observe the case where providers are not trusted
to limit the storage of the collected data. The profiles that each of the providers
composes after the user authentication are represented in Table 8. It is clear that
even though the same attributes are required to be shown by both providers,
the second provider offers better privacy to the users. This is because using the
government-issued eID reveals all the credential contents, rather than the singe
required attribute. Moreover, the unique attributes such as public key11 allow
to create links with other usages of the same certificate. On the other hand,
the anonymous credential issued by the trusted third party allows for selective
disclosure, thus offering more privacy to the user.
Table 8. The resulting profiles in untrusted providers’ databases.
Service provider Recorded information
Bookshop A
{NameU, SurnameU, AddressU, DoBU, PKU}eID ,
{Customer numberU, ZIP codeU}ShopperCard ,
{Shipping addressU}Free
Bookshop B
{DoBU}IDttp ,
{Customer numberU, ZIP codeU}ShopperCard ,
{Shipping addressU}Free
Trusted providers. In case the providers are trusted to store the data according
to their policies, the resulting states of their knowledge databases after inter-
action with the user are represented in Table 9. Even though Bookshop B was
determined to have a more privacy-friendly policy when all the collected data is
stored by providers, as it allows usage of credential technologies which support
selective disclosure of attributes, this example shows that for trusted providers
the result can differ. Namely, as Bookshop A does not store the date of birth
of the user, it offers better resulting privacy level to the user. Therefore, even
though X.509 technology is used for authentication with this provider, it is still
a preferable choice due to its more privacy-preserving storage policy.
4.3 Choosing between authentication policies
The framework can also support a more complex feedback provision about user
privacy level dependent on the sensitivity of particular attributes. If a user is
11 A unique attribute is also the certificate’s serial number, which is not modelled here.
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Table 9. The resulting profiles based on (trusted) providers’ policies.
Service provider Recorded information
Bookshop A
{Customer numberU}ShopperCard ,
{Shipping addressU}Free
Bookshop B
{DoBU}IDttp ,
{Customer numberU}ShopperCard ,
{Shipping addressU}Free
Table 10. Alternative authentication policies.
Alternative
Authentication requirements
disclosures
Policy A eIDgov: {Name, Surname, DoB}
Policy B IDTTP: {Name, Surname, DoB}
Policy C Student card: {University} & IDTTP: {Name, Surname}
presented with alternative disclosure policies, the framework can be used to
make a choice between them taking into account the specific attributes which
are required and their sources.
Three exemplary authentication alternatives are listed in Table 10. However,
the providers are not trusted to limit their storage of collected data to the
attributes required for authentication, but are assumed to store all data that is
disclosed in an interaction.
One of the framework input models represents the attribute weights for at-
tributes of different credentials or free user input. The higher the sensitivity of an
attribute, the greater the associated weight. The weights for the given example
are listed in Table 11. These weights can be adjusted according to the unique-
ness of specific values of the user’s attributes. This reflects the fact that a less
frequent attribute value, such as a unique name and surname, can be considered
more sensitive.
The resulting cost of a disclosure is calculated as a sum of the disclosures.
When the three different authentication requirements are modelled and the pos-
sible disclosures evaluated, Policy B is determined to be the least costly, with
the total cost of disclosures being 2.5. Policy A and C are related to the total
costs of 4.3 and 5.6, respectively. Although the same attributes are required to
be disclosed with policies A and B, the framework result shows that their re-
spective costs are not equal. This reflects the fact that using different credential
technologies has different effects on user privacy. Namely, The eID credential of
type X.509 discloses all recorded attributes, while anonymous credential tech-
nology allows for selective disclosure. Since the provider are not trusted to limit
their storage, and are assumed to store all the data that is disclosed in an in-
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Table 11. Attribute weights.
Credential
Attribute Weight
type
eID
Name 0.5
Surname 0.8
DoB 1.2
Address 3
Public key 1.5
IDTTP
Name 0.5
Surname 0.8
DoB 1.2
Student card
Name 0.5
Surname 0.7
Student number 1.3
University 0.3
Public key 1.5
teraction, the anonymous credentials are a more desirable solution and offer a
better privacy level.
5 Related work
For quantitative analysis of user privacy, Reiter and Rubin introduce the notion
of degree of anonymity [14], which is a continuum ranging from absolute privacy
to provable exposure. The actual quantification for the networks for anonymous
connections is presented by Diaz et al. [9]. The degree of anonymity is dependent
on the probability of an entity being the origin of a message. Serjantov et al.
[15] also propose an information theoretic measure of anonymity for mix-based
anonymity systems. It is also argued that the knowledge of the size of this
anonymity set is not sufficient to determine the anonymity level of a single
user, unless all users of the set are completely equal from the point of view of
identifiability.
As indicated by Clauß and Schiffner [4], it is not sufficient to observe only
the communication layer. Even when the users are indistinguishable at this level,
application-level data determines the anonymity level of a user. For instance, in
an interaction with a provider, a user may disclose a set of personal attributes
(at the application level), each of which is not highly sensitive and does not
significantly reduce the anonymity set. However, the attributes collectively may
suffice to derive the user’s identity. In order to evaluate the privacy level of a user,
we take multiple factors into consideration. Those are the kinds of attributes that
the user reveals in the interactions with a provider, the frequency of the attribute
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values12 and the provider’s access to other sources of user’s data. Our approach is
also compatible with different metrics for quantifying privacy properties (e.g. the
framework proposed by Clauß [3] for quantification of anonymity and linkability).
The obtained output of the framework can be combined with the chosen metrics
to quantify the achieved privacy properties of a user.
For these evaluations, it is important to know which information providers
collect, store and share. Even when privacy policies are available to users, they
may not provide expected information or may not be easy to understand [13, 11].
Some proposals aim to offer a uniform privacy policy format and make the poli-
cies more useful for the users. Examples are P3P [5] and the CARL [2] language.
They are, however, rarely utilised by providers. There are also possible policy
conflicts when multiple entities collaborate, which might be hard to detect [1]. In
the proposed system, the users are enabled to evaluate their privacy in differing
scenarios. Firstly, it is possible to take into account available information about
providers’ data management and sharing practices. Secondly, if providers are
not trusted to store a limited amount of information or limit their sharing, the
user may inspect her privacy level under the assumption that providers store all
collected information and offer them to other providers. Additionally, the frame-
work tackles the problem of users not being sufficiently familiar with the utilised
credential technologies to estimate their impact on privacy. For instance, if X.509
credentials are used for authentication, verification of the credential requires ac-
cess to all of its contents. This results in disclosure of all credential attributes,
even if the provider requested only a limited set. Storing the collected data may
be limited to only the requested set, but some providers might not be trusted to
do so.This is modelled in the framework and automatically taken into account
when the privacy-level results are created.
There are other approaches that analyse privacy by modelling knowledge of
users’ personal information. Veeningen et al. [17] describes a three-layer model
for personal information containing abstract and concrete description of the
information. Similarly, we take into account the abstract data description, i.e.
what the data represents, but also its concrete content. In addition, some meta-
data is captured, such as the entity who vouches for the validity of the user’s
information or the transaction in which the information is disclosed and the
service which it is disclosed for. The system is able to take this information into
account for modelling the provider’s deduction mechanism.
Our framework is based on the Prolog logic language. Usage of Prolog as
a security analysis tool and a law verifier was previously explored by Ho and
Sundaram [10]. It was applied to the HIPAA act [16] to check whether unautho-
rised entities can obtain access to resources. The findings suggested Prolog to be
useful for detecting vulnerabilities, although it required an adequate setup, i.e.
some knowledge of what needs to be inspected. We avoid these issues, as we use
Prolog to model system behaviour rather than to search for vulnerabilities.
Other logic programming languages were explored for a formal approach of
privacy modelling. An example is work of Decroix et al. [6, 7], which is based
12 This data includes the behavioural data as well as personal attributes.
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on the IDP system [12]. The IDP framework allows to model a system by defin-
ing its initial state and the rules which describe its functioning. Based on this
model, all possible system states are discovered and can be queried. The IDP
system is convenient for evaluating a system from the point of view of showing
how an undesirable state can be reached, thus demonstrating that the privacy
guarantees are defeated. Although IDP system offers an intuitive way to model
systems, its main drawback is the complexity constraint. It allows to analyse
only systems of limited complexity. In other words, only a certain number of
actors and actions can be observed. Another important feature of this related
work is that attributes are observed at a conceptual level, i.e. without modelling
the actual attribute values. Since differing frequency of an attribute value af-
fects the overall privacy level, we choose to take this aspect into account. By
modelling the actual contents of the exchanged attributes, the framework can
further be combined with complex algorithms for determining the privacy level
[3]. The usage of IDP was also explored by applying it to loyalty systems [8].
For evaluation, we apply our framework to a privacy-preserving public transport
ticketing system.
6 Conclusions
With the proliferation of electronic services, an average user is engaging in a
growing number of online interactions. In these interactions personal information
is disclosed for authentication or service delivery purposes. In order to manage
their identity, users need to keep track of the partial identities constructed by
the service providers. However, this is not an easy task, due to the complexity of
data flows or unclear data handling policies of providers. In addition, different
technologies have differing effects on user privacy, which is something users need
to be familiar with for attaining control over their identity management.
In order to facilitate the identity management task by allowing users to view
their partial identities held by different providers, we have devised a privacy-
feedback tool. It is implemented in the Prolog logic programming language and it
models the observed system and related data handling to inform the users which
information about her is held by which party. The results are dependent on the
specific disclosures, credential technologies, and data sharing policies of providers
and identifiability conditions which allow for linking different partial identities.
In addition, the framework assists the user to make a disclosure decision by
reviewing the impact it would have on her privacy level. This can also be used
to make a choice between providers with differing privacy policies. Finally, the
framework can also provide the cost of a disclosure based on a given model of
attribute weights.
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Appendix A Details on the Prolog implementation of the
first use case
The use case-specific input are definitions of relevant credentials, the providers’
policies, the specification of the unique attributes and attribute sets and the
user’s specific requests for services’ utilisation. The definitions of credentials
(such as C1 and C2, cf. further) should be provided by the credential issuer,
rather than requiring the users to create these models themselves. The policies
of the providers that define how user data is managed should also be provided
by the providers themselves. This limits the modelling effort that is performed
on the user side significantly.
The user’s credentials that are defined in the observed use case are the Belgian
national ID credential and the user’s student card:
%Credential definition C1 : BeID :
: −defineCredType(′X.509′, ′BeID′,
[attrDef(′Name′, ′String′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared′),
attrDef(′Surname′, ′String′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared′),
attrDef(′Address′, ′String′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared(limited)′),
attrDef(′DoB′, ′Date′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared′),
attrDef(′PK′, ′PublicKey′, ′Chosen′, ′Known′, ′Unique′)]).
%Credential definition C2 : Student card :
: −defineCredType(′X.509′, ′studentcard′,
[attrDef(′Name′, ′String′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared′),
attrDef(′Surname′, ′String′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared′),
attrDef(′Stud#′, ′Integer′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Unique′),
attrDef(′University′, ′String′, ′Known′, ′Assigned′, ′Shared′),
attrDef(′PK′, ′PublicKey′, ′Chosen′, ′Known′, ′Unique′)]).
The unique attributes are defined with:
: −assert(isUnique(′PK′, credSource(′X.509′, ′stud. card′, ′KULeuven′))).
: −assert(isUnique(′PK′, credSource(′X.509′, ′BeID′, ′gov′))).
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Attributes that are considered to create a unique set are also defined:
: −assert(uniqueSet(
[attrNameSourcePair(′Stud#′,
credSource(′X.509′, ′studentcard′, ′KULeuven′)),
attrNameSourcePair(′DoB′,
credSource(′X.509′, ′BeID′, ′gov′))])).
: −assert(uniqueSet(
[attrNameSourcePair(′StudentNumber′,
credSource(′X.509′, ′stud. card′, ′KULeuven′)),
attrNameSourcePair(′University′,
credSource(′X.509′, ′stud. card′, ′KULeuven′))])).
The models of unique attributes and attribute sets should be provided by is-
suers, who have an overview of the complete system. However, in case of privacy-
concerned users, they may add their own rules that create a ‘stricter’ model to
evaluate the information that is known about them.
The authentication policy of the provider is another part of the input. Its
model should be provided by the service provider itself, rather than requiring
their implementation on the user side. A policy model that is considered in the
example is:
%Authentication policy A1 : general purchase at OnlineShop :
: −assert(authPolicy(′OnlineShop′, ′purchaseGeneral′,
[attrAndSource(cred( , ′X.509′, ′BeID′, ), [′DoB′]),
attrAndSource(cred( , ′X.509′, ′stud. card′, ), [′Ownership′]),
attrAndSource(′userInput′, [′purchase′])])).
Final input are the user’s requests to utilise the purchasing service:
: −reqService(′Alice′, ′OnlineShop′, ′2′, ′purchaseGeneralProducts′).
: −reqService(′Alice′, ′OnlineShop′, ′3′, ′purchaseGeneralProducts′).
For every transaction, the user needs to provide only one such line of code.
Ideally, this would be performed automatically by a supporting tool that would
model every service request that a user makes. In the same way, it could model
transactions that a user is considering of making to provide feedback on them.
Based on the authentication policy that is defined, the disclosures are deter-
mined. The created object code of the presented modelling can be queried about
the links that different providers are able to establish. An example is checking
which links a specific party is able to establish:
?− isLinked(Provider, TID1, TID2, Reason).
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Given the initial state of the knowledge database and the disclosures that
the user makes, a snippet of the obtained result has the form:
Provider = ′OnlineShop′,
TID1 = ′2′,
TID2 = ′3′,
Reason = reason(′uniqueSet′,
[attrNameSourcePair(′Stud#′, credSource(′X.509′, ′stud. card′,
′KULeuven′)),
attrNameSourcePair(′DoB′, credSource(′X.509′, ′BeID′, ′gov′))]).
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